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Abstract
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a
natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees
stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is
maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak)
responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even
when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results
deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for ‘‘responsive couples markets’’,
viz., optimality, ﬁlled positions, and manipulation.
r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Labor markets are in a continuous process of change. The growing number of
couples with the same professional interests is part of this process. Couples seeking
positions in the same labor market form a growing part of the demand side.
However, they increase the complexity of the matching problem considerably since
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doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006now, in addition to ﬁnding a mutually agreeable solution for both sides of the labor
market, one also has to deal with groupdecision making on the demand side.
In addition to individual job quality, couples’ preferences may capture certain
‘‘complementarities’’ that are induced by the distance between jobs. Loosely
speaking, by complementarities we mean that the valuation of one partners job may
crucially depend on the other partner’s job, that is, the couple may consider job a to
be a good job for the husband while the wife holds job b; but unacceptable if the wife
holds job c: As in many other economic environments (e.g., multi-object auctions or
efﬁcient resource allocation with indivisibilities) the presence of complementarities,
or in other words the absence of sufﬁcient substitutability, may imply that
‘‘desirable’’ economic outcomes (e.g., Nash or general equilibria) fail to exist.
In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they
produce stable matchings.
1 In order to explain stability, let us assume for the
moment that one side of the market consists only of single workers, and the other
side consists of ﬁrms each with one position. A matching is then a partition of all
workers and ﬁrms into pairs (one worker is matched to one ﬁrm) and unmatched
workers and/or ﬁrms. Such a matching is ‘‘stable’’ if (a) each ﬁrm and worker has an
acceptable match, and (b) no ﬁrm and no worker prefer one another to their
respective matches. For matching markets with sufﬁcient substitutability instabilities
can be ruled out.
2 For one-to-one matching markets considered in this article, Roth
[16] demonstrates the possibility of instability in the presence of couples. In his
example, the couples’ preferences over pairs of positions (one position for each
member of the couple) seem to be somewhat arbitrary (see Table 1). In this article we
give some more intuitive examples of instability and aim to obtain a better
understanding of what happens when instabilities occur.
First, we show that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the
domain of ‘‘(weakly) responsive’’ preferences, stable matchings exist (Theorem 3.3).
A couple’s preferences are responsive if the unilateral improvement of one partner’s
job is considered beneﬁcial for the couple as well. If responsiveness only applies to
acceptable positions, then preferences are weakly responsive. Hence, (weakly)
responsive preferences may reﬂect situations where couples search for jobs in the
same metropolitan area (if one partner switches to a job he/she prefers and the
couple can still live together, then the couple is better off). Since responsiveness
essentially excludes complementarities in couples’ preferences that may for instance
be caused by distance considerations, this result—to some extent—may seem trivial.
However, it mirrors other results showing that a sufﬁcient amount of substitutability
implies the existence of desirable outcomes for the markets in question (see for
instance [17, many-to-one matching without money], [8, many-to-one matching with
money], [3, many-to-many schedule matching], and [7, two-sided matching with
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1Empirical evidence is given in Roth [16,19,20] and Xing [22].
2For one-to-one and many-to-one matching markets without money see [6,17], for many-to-one
matching markets with money [8], for many-to-one matching with afﬁrmative action constraints see [1], for
many-to-many schedule matching see [3], and for two-sided matching with contracts see [7]. This list is not
exhaustive.
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3
apply to preferences on the supply side (hospitals or ﬁrms) over sets of agents
(students or workers), while our responsiveness condition applies to preferences on
the demand side (couples of students) over ordered pairs of hospitals (not sets!). We
show that under a restricted unemployment aversion condition, the domain of
weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the existence of stable matchings
(Theorem 3.5). This implies that for strictly unemployment averse couples the
domain of responsive preferences where all positions are considered to be acceptable
is a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings (Corollary 3.6).
Next, we analyze the existence of stable matchings for couples markets without
any unemployment aversion condition. Then, proceeding from our possibility result
for responsive preferences, we show that the absence of stable matchings in couples
markets is not a theoretical irregularity: a single couple may cause a labor market to
be unstable even if its preference list is very consistently based on their individual
preferences and the desire to not live too far away from each other. In one of our
examples we demonstrate that even a small deviation from responsiveness can cause
instability (Example 3.8). Our nonexistence result persists even when we relax the
requirement of stability and use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic
blocking (Theorem 3.7). By means of another instructive example (Example 3.9) we





h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s4 s2 s2 h1h2 h4h2
s2 s3 s3 s4 h4h1 h4h3
s1 s2 s1 s1 h4h3 h4h1











No stable matching in a couples market [16].
3For instance, Alkan and Gale’s [3] ‘‘persistence’’ condition and Hatﬁeld and Milgrom’s [7]
‘‘substitution’’ condition both encompass Roth’s [17] ‘‘responsiveness’’ and Kelso and Crawford’s [8]
‘‘gross substitutes’’ condition on preferences of hospitals/ﬁrms over sets of students/workers and
corresponding wages.
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on the fact that for responsive preferences one can construct a unique associated
singles market with a nonempty set of stable matchings that is included in the set of
stable matchings of the original couples market. This might lead one to conclude
that, apart from the existence of stable matchings, other desirable properties of
stable matchings for singles markets (not generally transferred to general couples
markets) would carry over to couples markets with responsive preferences as well.
Unfortunately this is not the case. First, we demonstrate that even for the domain of
responsive preferences the set of stable matchings no longer needs to be a distributive
lattice (Theorem 4.2). More precisely, we strengthen results due to Aldershof and
Carducci [2] by showing that for couples markets with responsive preferences there
may be no optimal stable matching for either side of the market. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that different stable matchings may assign positions to different
applicants and/or have a different number of positions ﬁlled (Theorem 4.3). Finally,
we show that for the domain of responsive preferences there exists no strategy-proof
stable-matching mechanism based on revealed preferences. More precisely, we show
that there is no stable-matching mechanism for which stating the true preferences is a
dominant strategy for every couple (Theorem 4.5).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple couples
market where the labor market modeled consists of a supply side of four hospitals
and a demand side of two couples composed of medical students. In Section 3, we
establish the existence of stable matchings for weakly responsive preferences and
demonstrate that under restricted strict unemployment aversion the domain of
weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the existence of stable matchings.
We also demonstrate with two examples how small deviations from (weak)
responsiveness that incorporate the distance considerations of a couple may lead
to instability. In Section 4, we show that both the lattice structure and the invariable
groupof matched agents of the set of stable matchings need not carry over
from singles markets to couples markets with responsive preferences. Finally,
still assuming preferences to be responsive, we show that any stable-matching
mechanism is prone to manipulation by couples misrepresenting their preferences.
We conclude with Section 5, where we discuss the relation of our results for couples
markets to those of Hatﬁeld and Milgrom [7] for matching markets with
contracts.
2. Matching with couples: the model
For convenience and without loss of generality, we describe a simple couples
market where the labor market modeled consists of a supply side of four hospitals
and a demand side of two couples composed of medical students; H ¼
fh1;h2;h3;h4g; S ¼f s1;s2;s3;s4g; and C ¼f c1;c2g¼f ð s1;s2Þ;ðs3;s4Þg are the sets
of hospitals, students, and couples, respectively. Each hospital has exactly one
position to be ﬁlled. All of our results can easily be adapted to more general
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multiple positions.
4 Next, we describe preferences of hospitals, students, and couples.
Hospitals’ preferences: Each hospital hAH has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation kh over the set of students S and the prospect of having its
position unﬁlled, denoted by |: Hospital h’s preferences can be represented by a strict
ordering of the elements in S,f|g; for instance, PðhÞ¼s4;s2;|;s1;s3 indicates that
hospital h prefers student s4 to s2; and considers students s1 and s3 to be
unacceptable. In the remainder of the paper each hospital typically prefers its
position ﬁlled by some student rather than unﬁlled. Let PH ¼f PðhÞghAH:
Students’ preferences: Similarly, each student sAS has an individual strict,
transitive, and complete preference relation ks over the set of hospitals and the
prospect of being unemployed, denoted by u: Let hAH: If hgs u; then hospital h is
acceptable to student s; if u gs h; then hospital h is unacceptable to student s: We
assume that these individual preferences are the preferences a student has if he/she is
single. Student s’s individual preferences can be represented by a strict ordering of
the elements in H,fug; for instance, PðsÞ¼h1;h2;h3;h4;u indicates that student s
prefers hi to hiþ1 for i ¼ 1;2;3 and prefers being employed to being unemployed. Let
PS ¼f PðsÞgsAS:
Couples’ preferences: Finally, each couple cAC has a strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation kc over all possible combination of ordered pairs of
(different) hospitals and the prospect of being unemployed. Couple c’s preferences
can be represented by a strict ordering of the elements in H :¼½ ð H,fugÞ  
ðH,fugÞ \fðh;hÞ: hAHg: To simplify notation, we denote a generic element of H by
ðhp;hqÞ; where hp and hq indicate a hospital or being unemployed. For instance,
PðcÞ¼ð h4;h2Þ; ðh3;h4Þ; ðh4;uÞ; etc., indicates that couple c ¼ð s1;s2Þ prefers s1 and s2
being matched to h4 and h2; respectively, to being matched to h3 and h4; respectively,
and so on. Let PC ¼f PðcÞgcAC:
Note that when presenting preferences in examples, we often use column notation.
Furthermore, whenever we use the strict part g of a preference relation, we assume
that we compare different elements in S,f|g; H,fug; or H:
We use the following restrictions on the couples’ preferences in the remainder of
the paper.
Unemployment aversion: A couple c is strongly unemployment averse if it prefers
full employment to the employment of only one partner and the employment of only
one partner to the unemployment of both partners. Formally, for all hp;hq;hrau;
ðhp;hqÞ gc ðhr;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ and ðhp;hqÞ gc ðu;hrÞ gc ðu;uÞ:
A couple c is strictly unemployment averse if it is worse off if one of its partners
looses his/her position. Formally, for all hp;hqau; ðhp;hqÞ gc ðhp;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ and
ðhp;hqÞ gc ðu;hqÞ gc ðu;uÞ:
Note that strong unemployment aversion implies strict unemployment aversion.
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5 Note that a priori we do not require any relation between
students’ individual preferences and couples’ preferences. In fact, we cannot or do
not always wish to specify individual preferences when couples are concerned.
However, we do study some situations in which there is a clear relationship. This is
the case when the unilateral improvement of one partner’s job is considered
beneﬁcial for the couple as well. Couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ has responsive preferences if there
exist preferences ksk and ksl such that for all hp;hq;hrAH,fug; [hp gsk hr implies
ðhp;hqÞ gc ðhr;hqÞ] and [hp gsl hr implies ðhq;hpÞgcðhq;hrÞ]. If these associated
individual preferences ksk and ksl exist, then they are unique.
6 Note that if a couple
ðsk;slÞ has responsive preferences, then one can easily derive the associated
individual preferences ksk and ksl (see for instance Klaus et al. [9, Example 2.1]).
Leader–follower responsive preferences: A couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ has leader–follower
responsive preferences if it has responsive preferences and in addition gives
precedence to the job quality for one of its members ﬁrst (without loss of generality
we assume that sk is the leader and sl the follower), i.e., for all hp;hx;hq;hyAH,fug;
ðhp;hxÞ gc ðhq;hyÞ implies ðhp;hx
0Þ gc ðhq;hy
0Þ for all hx
0;hy
0AH,fug:
Singles and couples markets: Now, the standard one-to-one two-sided matching
market with single students, or singles market for short, is denoted by ðPH;PSÞ: Since
singles markets and some of the classical results for singles markets are well-known,
for a detailed description we refer to Roth and Sotomayor [21] who give an excellent
introduction to this model and review all results that are relevant here. For instance,
the set of stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the core. A one-to-one
matching market with couples, or a couples market for short, is denoted by
ðPH;PCÞ:
7
Matchings:Amatching m for a couples market ðPH;PCÞ is an assignment of
students and hospitals such that each student is assigned to at most one hospital in H
or to u (which can be assigned to multiple students), each hospital in H is assigned to
at most one student or to | (which can be assigned to multiple hospitals), and a
student is assigned to a hospital if and only if the hospital is assigned to the student.
By mðSÞ¼mðs1Þ;mðs2Þ;mðs3Þ;mðs4Þ we denote the hospital in H or u matched to
students s1;s2;s3;s4: Thus, sk is matched to mðskÞ: Alternatively, by mðHÞ¼
mðh1Þ;mðh2Þ;mðh3Þ;mðh4Þ we denote the students in S or | matched to hospitals
h1;h2;h3;h4: Note that the matching m associated to ðPH;PCÞ can be completely
described either by mðSÞ or by mðHÞ; but both notations will be useful later.
8
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5The concept of responsive preferences was ﬁrst introduced in [17], but differs from ours as it deals with
hospitals having preferences over (unordered) sets of students.
6Note that these derived preferences ksk and ksl need not coincide with the students’ individual
preferences. However, in order to keep notation as simple as possible, we denote the derived preferences
the same way as we denote students’ individual preferences.
7Instead of denoting a couples market by ðPH;PCÞ; we could add students’ individual preferences and
consider ðPH;PS;PCÞ: Since we do not explicitly use the students’ individual preferences, we suppress
them in our notation.
8In our model with two couples and four hospitals we have 209 different matchings: 24 ¼ð 4
4Þ
2   4!
matchings with full employment, 96 ¼ð 4
3Þ
2   3! matchings with one unemployed student, 72 ¼ð 4
2Þ
2   2!
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matching to be stable, it should always be better for students (one or both members
in a couple) to accept the position(s) offered by the matching instead of voluntarily
choosing unemployment and for hospitals it should always be better to accept the
student assigned by the matching instead of leaving the position unﬁlled. A matching
m is individually rational if
(i1) for all c ¼ð sk;slÞ; ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞkc ðmðskÞ;uÞ; ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ kc ðu;mðslÞÞ; and
ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ kc ðu;uÞ;
(i2) for all hAH; mðhÞkh |:
Second, if one partner in a couple can improve the given matching for the couple by
switching to another hospital such that this hospital is better off as well, then we
would expect this mutually beneﬁcial trade to be carried out, rendering the given
matching unstable. A similar statement holds if both students in the couple can
improve. For a given matching m; ðc ¼ð sk;slÞ;ðhp;hqÞÞ is a blocking coalition if
(b1) ðhp;hqÞ gc ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ;
(b2) [hpAH implies skkhp mðhpÞ]a n d[ hqAH implies slkhq mðhqÞ].
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking
coalitions.
9
Instability in a couples market: Roth [16, Theorem 10] shows that stable matchings
may not exist in the presence of couples. He considers the couples market ðPH;PCÞ
given by Table 1.
10 We use the following convention for this and future examples. If
| is not listed for hospitals, then all students are acceptable.
By giving a blocking coalition for each of the 24 individually rational full
employment matchings, Roth shows that no stable matching exists. Note that
neither couple’s preferences are responsive. (For couple c1 ¼ð s1;s2Þ this follows for
instance from ðh1;h4Þ gc1 ðh1;h3Þ and ðh2;h3Þ gc1 ðh2;h4Þ:)
In the next section, departing from Roth’s example, we address one of the open
questions and research directions that Roth and Sotomayor [21, p. 246] indicate,
namely to ‘‘find reasonable assumptions about the preferences of married
couples that assure the nonemptiness of the core’’. In other words, are there
classes of ‘‘real-world preferences’’ for which stable matchings always exist? Given
the NP completeness (computational complexity) of determining if a couples market
has a stable matching [14], this question seems even more intricate.
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matchings with two unemployed students, 16 ¼ð 4
1Þ
2   1! matchings with three unemployed students, and
1 ¼ð 4
0Þ
2   0! full unemployment matching.
9In order to keep notation as simple as possible, we allow some redundancy in the deﬁnition of stability
with respect to (i1) and (b1).
10Roth’s [16] and our later results do not depend on the tails (not speciﬁed by Roth [16]) of the couples’
preferences, which only contain unacceptable combinations of positions.
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First, we establish an existence result. It is based on the intuition that if there exists
no negative externality from one partner’s job for the other partner or for the couple,
then we can treat the market as if only singles participate. By doing this, we can
guarantee the existence of a stable matching [6]. This would be the case if couples
only apply for jobs in one city or metropolitan area so that different regional
preferences or travel distance are no longer part of couples’ preferences and therefore
the preferences are responsive. For our existence result, we slightly extend the
domain of responsive preferences. The idea of this extension is that the exact
associated preferences that deal with the comparison of unacceptable positions are
irrelevant with respect to stability since an agent can always replace any
unacceptable position with unemployment.
Weakly responsive preferences: Couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ has weakly responsive prefer-
ences if there exist preferences ksk and ksl such that
(i) for all hAH;
ðu;hÞ gc ðu;uÞ if and only if hgslu;
ðh;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ if and only if hgsku; and
(ii) for all hp;hq;hrAH,fug;
½hp ksk u; hq ksl u; and hp gsk hr imply ðhp;hqÞ gc ðhr;hqÞ  and
½hp ksl u;hq ksk u; and hp gsl hr imply ðhq;hpÞ gc ðhq;hrÞ :
Remark 3.1. If these associated individual preferences ksk and ksl exist, then they
are only uniquely determined for acceptable positions. In other words, if both [ksk
and ksl] and [k0
sk and k0
sl] satisfy the two conditions above, then for all
hp;hqAH,fug; hp gsk hq ksk u implies hp g0
sk hq k0




Note that responsive preferences are weakly responsive. In the next example we
show that not all weakly responsive preferences are responsive.
Example 3.2 (Weakly responsive but not responsive). Consider couple c1 ¼ð s1;s2Þ’s
preferences given by Pðc1Þ¼ð h1;h2Þ;ðh1;uÞ;ðu;h2Þ;ðh2;uÞ; ðu;uÞ;ðh3;uÞ;y:
Suppose couple c1’s preferences are responsive. Then the (unique) associated
individual preferences are of the form Pðs1Þ¼h1;h2;u;h3;h4 and Pðs2Þ¼h2;u;y .
By responsiveness, ðh3;h2Þgc1ðh3;uÞ; a contradiction.
It is easy to see that c1’s preferences are weakly responsive: for any preferences ks1
and ks2 with Pðs1Þ¼h1;h2;u;y and Pðs2Þ¼h2;u;y (tails can be anything)
conditions (i) and (ii) of weak responsiveness are satisﬁed, independently of the
couple’s preferences after ðu;uÞ:
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preferences. Then, from the couples’ weakly responsive preferences we can determine
associated individual preferences for all students that are members of a couple. By
ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ we denote an associated singles market we obtain by replacing couples
and their preferences in ðPH;PCÞ by individual students and their (possibly not
uniquely determined) associated individual preferences PSðPCÞ: It is important to
note and easy to see that all associated singles markets have the same set of stable
matchings (see Remark 3.1). Notice also that for responsive preferences there exists a
unique associated singles market ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ:
Theorem 3.3 (Stability for weakly responsive preferences). Let ðPH;PCÞ be a couples
market where couples have weakly responsive preferences. Then, any matching that is
stable for an associated singles market ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ is also stable for ðPH;PCÞ: In
particular, there exists a stable matching for ðPH;PCÞ:
Proof. Let m be a stable matching for ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ and consider any couple c ¼
ðsk;slÞ: Stability of m in ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ implies that
mðskÞksku and mðslÞkslu:
If ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ ¼ ðu;uÞ; then stability condition (i1) is trivially satisﬁed. If
mðskÞ gsk u and mðslÞ¼u; then by weak responsiveness (i), ðmðskÞ;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ;
which implies (i1). Similarly, mðskÞ¼u and mðslÞ gsl u implies (i1). Finally, assume
mðskÞ gsk u and mðslÞgslu: Then by weak responsiveness (ii),
ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ gc ðmðskÞ;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ: Similarly, ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ gc ðu;mðslÞÞ gc ðu;uÞ:
Hence, any stable matching m in ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ is individually rational for ðPH;PCÞ as
well.
Suppose now that m is not stable for ðPH;PCÞ: Hence, there exists a blocking
coalition, for instance ððsk;slÞ;ðhp;hqÞÞ: Then, (b1) ðhp;hqÞ gc ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ and (b2)
[hpAH implies sk khp mðhpÞ]a n d[ hqAH implies sl khq mðhqÞ].
Assume hp!sku and hq!slu: Then by weak responsiveness (ii),
ðu;uÞ gc ðu;hqÞ gc ðhp;hqÞ: Using (b1) it follows that ðu;uÞ gc ðmðskÞ;mðslÞÞ;
contradicting individual rationality of m in ðPH;PCÞ: Hence, hp ksk u or hq ksl u:
Assume that hp ksk u and hq!slu: Then by weak responsiveness (ii),
ðhp;uÞ gc ðhp;hqÞ: Hence, ððsk;slÞ;ðhp;uÞÞ is a blocking coalition for m: Similarly,
if hp!sku and hq ksl u; then ðu;hqÞ gc ðhp;hqÞ and ððsk;slÞ;ðu;hqÞÞ is a blocking
coalition for m: Hence, without loss of generality, one can assume that, for blocking
coalition ððsk;slÞ;ðhp;hqÞÞ;
hpksku and hqkslu:
Suppose that hp gsk mðskÞ or hq gsl mðslÞ: Then, according to (b2), ðsk;hpÞ or ðsl;hqÞ
can block m in ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ: Hence,
mðskÞ ksk hp and mðslÞ ksl hq:
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which contradicts (b1). Hence, m is also stable for ðPH;PCÞ: Finally, by Gale and
Shapley [6] a stable matching for ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ always exists. &
The following example shows that not all stable matchings for ðPH;PCÞ may be
stable for ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ; even when couples are strongly unemployment averse and
have responsive preferences. The intuition is that some matching that would be
unstable in a singles market is now stable because a student may not want to block it
by taking the position of his/her partner.
We use the following convention for this and future examples. If the
unemployment option u is not listed for students, then both couples are strongly
unemployment averse.
Example 3.4 (ðPH;PCÞ has more stable matchings than ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ). Consider the
couples market ðPH;PCÞ where preferences are given by Table 2 and the students’
individual preferences PS equal Pðs1Þ¼Pðs3Þ¼h4;h1;h2;h3;u and Pðs2Þ¼Pðs4Þ¼
h2;h1;h4;h3;u: It can easily be checked that the couples’ preferences can be
completed such that they are responsive with respect to the individual preferences
(and are in addition identical). There are four stable matchings for the couples
market ðPH;PCÞ given by m1ðSÞ¼h1;h4;h3;h2; m2ðSÞ¼h4;h1;h3;h2; m3ðSÞ¼
h3;h4;h2;h1; and m4ðSÞ¼h4;h3;h2;h1 (see appendix). However, matching m2 is the
unique stable matching for the associated singles market ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ:
For our next result, a maximal domain result for the existence of stable matchings,
we ﬁrst introduce a weaker notion of strict unemployment aversion by requiring





h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
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ðPH;PCÞ has more stable matchings than ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ:
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deﬁnition of an acceptable position as follows. Let c ¼ð sk;slÞ and hAH: Then, hi s
acceptable to student sk if ðh;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ and h is acceptable to student sl if
ðu;hÞgcðu;uÞ:
Restricted strict unemployment aversion: Couple c has restricted strictly unemploy-
ment averse preferences if for any pair of acceptable positions it is worse off if one of
its partners looses his/her acceptable position. Formally, for all ðhp;hqÞ such that
ðhp;uÞ gc ðu;uÞ and ðu;hqÞ gc ðu;uÞ; ðhp;hqÞ gc ðhp;uÞ and ðhp;hqÞ gc ðu;hqÞ:
11
Next we prove that if couples are restricted strictly unemployment averse, then the
domain of weakly responsive preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of
stable matchings. In other words, we show that in a couples market with only
restricted strictly unemployment averse couples and at least one couple whose
preferences are not weakly responsive, we can construct (weakly) responsive
preferences for the other couple(s) such that no stable matching exists.
Theorem 3.5 (Maximal domain I). For couples markets with restricted strictly
unemployment averse couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences is a
maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a counter example for each possible
violation of weak responsiveness. Assume that couple c1 ¼ð s1;s2Þ’s preferences are
restricted strictly unemployment averse, but not weakly responsive. Consider ks1
and ks2 satisfying weak responsiveness condition (i). Since couple c1’s preferences
are not weakly responsive, ks1 and ks2 satisfy weak responsiveness condition (ii). It
follows that there exist hq; % hqAH,fug; hqa% hq such that for some hp;hrAH,fug;
hpahr we have
ð½hq; % hq ks1 u; hp ks2 u; ðhq;hpÞgc1ðhq;hrÞ  and
½hq; % hq ks1 u; hr ks2 u; ð% hq;hrÞ gc1 ð% hq;hpÞ Þ or
ð½hp ks1 u; hq; % hq ks2 u; ðhp;hqÞ gc1 ðhr;hqÞ  and
½hr ks1 u; hq; % hq ks2 u; ðhr; % hqÞ gc1 ðhp; % hqÞ :Þ
Thus, with a slight abuse of notation
12 and without loss of generality,
13 there exist
h1;h2;h3;h4AH,fug such that h1ah2; h3ah4; and
h1;h2 ks1 u; h3;h4 ks2 u; ðh1;h3Þgc1ðh1;h4Þ; and ðh2;h4Þgc1ðh2;h3Þ:
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11The assumption of restricted strict unemployment aversion is particularly realistic in entry level labor
markets where choosing unemployment, while acceptable jobs are available, may be harmful for future job
prospects.
12The objects h1;h2;h3;h4AH,fug may not be the four hospitals introduced in Section 2.
13The role of s1 and s2 can be switched.
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ðh1;h3Þ: We construct a contradiction for Case (a) (Case (b) is analogous). By (a) and
transitivity, ðh1;h3Þ gc1 ðh2;h3Þ:
Thus, if h1 ¼ u; then ðu;h3Þ gc1 ðh2;h3Þ: Since h1ah2; h2 gs1 u: If h3 ¼ u; then
h2 gs1 u and weak responsiveness condition (i) implies ðh2;uÞ gc1 ðu;uÞ: If h3au;
then h3 gs2 u and weak responsiveness condition (i) implies ðu;h3Þ gc1 ðu;uÞ: Thus,
by restricted strict unemployment aversion, ðh2;h3Þ gc1 ðu;h3Þ: Both cases contra-
dict ðu;h3Þ gc1 ðh2;h3Þ: Hence, h1AH: Similarly, weak responsiveness condition (i),
restricted strict unemployment aversion, and ðh1;h3Þ gc1 ðh1;h4Þ imply h3AH and
weak responsiveness condition (i), restricted strict unemployment aversion, and




Couple c2 ¼ð s3;s4Þ has restricted strictly unemployment averse responsive
preferences based on Pðs3Þ¼h3;h1;u;y and Pðs4Þ¼u;y:
Case 1: h2AH: Let Pðh2Þ¼s1;|;y . Note that for any individually rational
matching m; mðc2ÞAfðh3;uÞ;ðh1;uÞ;ðu;uÞg: Assume that m is stable.
If mðc2Þ¼ð u;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð h1;h3Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc2;ðh1;uÞÞ: If
mðc2Þ¼ð h1;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð h2;h4Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc2;ðh3;uÞÞ: If mðc2Þ¼
ðh3;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð h1;h4Þ or mðc1Þ¼ð h2;h4Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc1;ðh1;h3ÞÞ:
Thus, all candidates for a stable matching are blocked.
Case 2: h2 ¼ u: Note that for any individually rational matching m;mðc2ÞA
fðh3;uÞ;ðh1;uÞ; ðu;uÞg: Assume that m is stable.
If mðc2Þ¼ð u;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð h1;h3Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc2;ðh1;uÞÞ: If
mðc2Þ¼ð h1;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð u;h4Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc2;ðh3;uÞÞ: If mðc2Þ¼
ðh3;uÞ; then mðc1Þ¼ð h1;h4Þ: Hence, m is blocked by ðc1;ðh1;h3ÞÞ: Thus, all
candidates for a stable matching are blocked. &
It is easy to ﬁnd examples that demonstrate that the domain of weakly responsive
preferences is no longer maximal once restricted strict unemployment aversion is
dropped. For instance a couple c with PðcÞ¼ð h;uÞ;ðu;h0Þ;ðu;uÞ;y will never cause
instability, no matter how the remaining preferences are speciﬁed.
14
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14We sketch the proof of this argument. Consider the following preference domain: any couple c’s
preferences are weakly responsive or are PðcÞ¼ð h;uÞ;ðu;h0Þ;ðu;uÞ;y; for some h;h0AH: Obviously, the
new domain strictly includes the domain of weakly responsive preferences. We construct a stable matching
for any proﬁle of preferences in the new domain as follows. First, construct associated individual
preferences for couples with weakly responsive preferences. Second, for any couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ with PðcÞ¼
ðh;uÞ;ðu;h0Þ;ðu;uÞ;y; deﬁne associated individual preferences by PðskÞ¼h;u;y and PðslÞ¼h0;u;y .
Now apply the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm [6] to the associated singles market to
obtain a tentative matching. If this matching is individually rational for all couples, then it is stable in the
original couples market. Since individual rationality is automatically satisﬁed for weakly responsive
couples, if individual rationality is violated for a couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ; then there are h;h0AH such that
PðcÞ¼ð h;uÞ;ðu;h0Þ;ðu;uÞ;y and mðcÞ¼ð h;h0Þ: Redeﬁne associated individual preferences by PðskÞ¼
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stronger condition of strict unemployment aversion are responsive preferences where
all hospitals are acceptable, that is, a strictly unemployment averse couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ
with weakly responsive preferences must in fact have responsive preferences with
unique associated individual preferences that can be represented by PðskÞ¼y;u
and PðslÞ¼y;u:
Corollary 3.6 (Maximal domain II). For couples markets with strictly unemployment
averse couples, the domain of responsive preferences where all hospitals are considered
acceptable in the associated individual preferences is a maximal domain for the
existence of stable matchings.
Next, we dropthe condition of (restricted) strict unemp loyment aversion and
address the question whether or not one can enlarge the domain of (weakly)
responsive preferences while still guaranteeing the existence of stable matchings. In
fact, we start with a somewhat less ambitious task. First we relax the requirement of
stability by excluding myopic behavior of blocking coalitions and ask for which
reasonable preference domains ‘‘weakly stable’’ matchings always exist (see [10] for
weak stability in singles markets).
To model non-myopic behavior we assume that if the assignment of hospitals to
students and students to hospitals that a blocking coalition proposes for
themselves is not likely to be their ﬁnal ‘‘match’’, then the blocking will not take
place. Let m be a matching and ððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ be a blocking coalition. We model
two cases in which a blocking coalition’s match most likely will not be their ﬁnal
match:
* the couple ðt1;t2Þ that participates in the blocking coalition ððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ can do
better for themselves in another blocking coalition ððt1;t2Þ;ðk1;k2ÞÞ such that the
other agents (one or both hospitals) that are participating in both blocking
coalitions are not worse off.
So, if couple ðt1;t2Þ also blocks m together with hospitals ðk1;k2Þ; then ðt1;t2Þ
prefers ðk1;k2Þ to ðl1;l2Þ; which it would be matched with in the other blocking
coalition, i.e., (d1) ðk1;k2Þ gðt1;t2Þðl1;l2Þ:
If a hospital participates in both blocking coalitions, then it is not worse off,
i.e., if for some i;j ¼ 1;2; ki ¼ lj; then (d2) tikkitj:
* A hospital lp that participates in the blocking coalition ððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ can do
better for itself in another blocking coalition ððz1;z2Þ;ðk1;k2ÞÞ such that the other
agents (the other hospital or the couple) participating in both blocking coalitions
are not worse off.
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(footnote continued)
h;u;y and PðslÞ¼u;y . The student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm applied to the adjusted
associated singles market gives another tentative matching where students are weakly better off. If this
matching is individually rational for all couples, then it is stable in the original couples market. If
individual rationality is violated for any couple, then redeﬁne associated individual preferences, and so on.
This procedure will ﬁnally produce a stable matching for the original couples market.
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ððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ; and zr be the student that is assigned to hospital kr ¼ lp in
blocking coalition ððz1;z2Þ;ðk1;k2ÞÞ:
So, if hospital kr ¼ lp blocks m together with hospital ks (fkr;ksg¼f k1;k2g)
and couple ðz1;z2Þ; then it obtains a better student, i.e., (d2) zrglptp:
If the other hospital lq participates in both blocking coalitions (i.e., ks ¼ lq),
then it is not worse off, i.e., (d2) zsklqtq:
If the new blocking coalition is formed with the same couple, then it is not
worse off, i.e., (d1) ðk1;k2Þkðt1;t2Þðl1;l2Þ:
We now give the formal deﬁnition. Let m be a matching. We say that a blocking
coalition ððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ is dominated by another blocking coalition
ððz1;z2Þ;ðk1;k2ÞÞaððt1;t2Þ;ðl1;l2ÞÞ; if
(d1) if ðz1;z2Þ¼ð t1;t2Þ; then ðk1;k2Þkðz1;z2Þðl1;l2Þ;
(d2) for all i;j ¼ 1;2; if ki ¼ ljAH; then zikkitj;
(d3) ðz1;z2Þ¼ð t1;t2Þ or ki ¼ ljAH for some i;j ¼ 1;2:
15
A matching m is weakly stable if it is individually rational and all blocking
coalitions are dominated. Clearly, a stable matching is weakly stable. Note also that
a matching with a single blocking coalition cannot be weakly stable. In some
contexts it is natural to focus only on weakly stable matching with full employment
(for instance when couples are strongly unemployment averse). For Roth’s example
(Table 1) there are three weakly stable matchings with full employment (see
appendix).
Now one might wonder whether with this weaker concept of stability we may
extend the existence result in Theorem 3.3 to a larger class of preferences. For singles
markets Klijn and Masso ´ [10] show that the set of weakly stable matchings contains
Zhou’s [23] bargaining set. Hence, Zhou’s [23] result that in general the bargaining
set is nonempty indicates that studying weak stability might be a fruitful approach.
The next theorem, however, crushes any hope for this approach.
Theorem 3.7 (No weak stability). In couples markets the set of weakly stable
matchings may be empty.
The following example proves Theorem 3.7. In the example, we construct a
couples market where couples have leader–follower responsive preferences. Then, we
create a new market by switching two pairs of hospitals in one couple’s preference
relation. However similar the two markets may seem, there is no weakly stable
matching for the new market. In particular, there is no stable matching for the new
market.
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15By (d3) we ensure that we only compare conﬂicting blocking coalitions in the sense that there exists at
least one agent that is present in both blocking coalitions. Otherwise, domination is not possible.
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couples market where preferences are given by Table 3 and the students’ individual
preferences equal Pðs1Þ¼h3;h4;h1;h2;u; Pðs2Þ¼h1;h2;h3;h4;u; and Pðs3Þ¼
Pðs4Þ¼h2;h1;h3;h4;u: Differences in the students’ individual preferences can be
easily explained by ‘‘regional preferences’’: even though there may exist a unanimous
ranking of hospitals according to prestige or salary, students may rank certain
hospitals differently because they prefer to live in a certain region, for instance, they
prefer to live on the West Coast instead of on the East Coast, or vice versa. Note that
both couples are strongly unemployment averse and the ﬁrst couple’s preferences are
leader–follower responsive. The second couple’s preferences are obtained by ﬁrst
constructing leader–follower responsive preferences and then switching the last and
second from last entries (in fact, only two hospitals for agent s4 are switched—the
switch is denoted in boldface in Table 3). This switch can be easily justiﬁed by
assuming that hospital h3 is closer than hospital h2 to hospital h4: In the worst case
scenario where leader s3 is assigned to h4; the couple’s wish to be closer together may
overrule any preference for follower s4: Note also that the hospitals have identical
preferences over students, which can be easily justiﬁed if hospitals rank students
according to ﬁnal grades or other test scores. It is tedious but not difﬁcult to check
that no weakly stable matching with full employment, and therefore by individual
rationality no weakly stable matching, exists (see appendix).
Example 3.8 exhibits almost responsive preferences, except for a single switch that
can easily be explained by the desire of couple ðs3;s4Þ to be closer together if the
leader is assigned to hospital h4; his/her worst option. Therefore, this example brings
us closer to answering Roth and Sotomayor’s [21] question in the negative in the
following sense. If we extend the domain of (weakly) responsive preferences to allow
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s4 s4 s4 s4 h3h1 h2h1
s1 s1 s1 s1 h3h2 h2h3
s2 s2 s2 s2 h3h4 h2h4









Wanting to be a little bit closer may create instability.
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then stable matchings may not exist.
The next example is another one without a stable matching that is based on simple
preferences that can be explained intuitively. Note that in the previous example
students have different regional preferences (see explanation in Example 3.8), which
create different individual preferences. The following example deals with preferences
that are based on identical individual preferences of students (no differences because
of regional preferences). But, in addition, we assume that if positions are too far
away, the unemployment of one partner may be preferred to being separated, that is,
we drop the assumption of strong unemployment aversion. This example also
illustrates how students’ individual preferences may differ from the students’






h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s1 s1 s1 s1 h2h3 h2h3
s3 s3 s3 s3 h2h4 h2h4
s4 s4 s4 s4 h3h2 h3h2


















Separation is out of the question.
16Cantala [4] also studies the existence of stable matchings in relation to distance aspects. He shows non-
existence of stable matchings for some restricted preference domain, for instance he assumes that
‘‘preferences of couples satisfy the strong regional lexicographic conditions and that couples face the same
geographical constraint’’.
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couples market ðPH;PCÞ where preferences are given by Table 4 and the students’
individual preferences PS for sAS equal PðsÞ¼h1;h2;h3;h4;u: Both couples have the
same preference relation. Note that as singles all students like hospital h1 best.
However, assume that hospitals h2; h3; and h4 are close together, while hospital h1 is
very far away. Now, instead of being separated, the partner of a student who is
matched to hospital h1 would not accept his/her position because unemployment is
preferable to separation. When ranking matchings consisting of two positions, each
couple uses lexicographic preferences with respect to the quality of the position. Note
that if we focus only on individually rational matchings with full employment, then
the agents’ preferences are responsive. In this case, a student’s derived associated
individual preference over hospitals (excluding u) equals h2;h3;h4;h1: Comparing
this to the student’s individual preferences, we see that hospital h1 moved from being
the best position for the single student to being the worst position for the member of
a couple, because working at h1 either means separation from or unemployment of
the partner.
It is easy to prove that no stable matching exists. Moreover, there is no weakly
stable matching with full employment (this follows easily since any such matching is
not individually rational). However, one can show for instance that the matching
given by mðSÞ¼u;h1;h4;h3 is weakly stable. We prove these statements in the
appendix.
4. Further results for stable matchings when preferences are responsive: optimality,
ﬁlled positions, and manipulation
Recall that when preferences are responsive one can construct a unique associated
singles market with a nonempty set of stable matchings that is included in the set of
stable matchings of the original couples market. In this section, we analyze
properties of the set of stable matchings for couples markets when preferences are
responsive.
Apart from the fact that stable matchings always exist in the absence of couples,
singles markets have other interesting features. If preferences are strict, the set of
stable matchings has the structure of a (distributive) lattice, which we explain next.
Let ðPH;PSÞ be a singles market and m and m0 two of its matchings. We deﬁne a
function l   m3Sm0 that assigns to each student his/her more preferred match from m
and m0: Formally, let l ¼ m3Sm0 be deﬁned for all sAS by lðsÞ :¼ mðsÞ if mðsÞgs m0ðsÞ
and lðsÞ :¼ m0ðsÞ otherwise. In a similar way we deﬁne the function m4Sm0; which
gives each student his/her less preferred match. In a dual way we deﬁne a function
* l   m3Hm0 that assigns to each hospital its more preferred match from m and m0:
Formally, let * l ¼ m3Hm0 be deﬁned for all hAH by * lðhÞ :¼ mðhÞ if mðhÞgh m0ðhÞ and
* lðhÞ :¼ m0ðhÞ otherwise. In a similar way we deﬁne the function m4Hm0; which gives
each hospital its less preferred match.
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attributed to John Conway. One of the implications of the theorem is that there is a
polarization of interests between the two sides of the market along the set of stable
matchings.
Theorem 4.1 (Conway’s lattice theorem for singles markets). Let ðPH;PSÞ be a
singles market and m and m0 be two stable matchings. Then, m3Sm0 ¼ m4Hm0 and
m4Sm0 ¼ m3Hm0 are stable matchings. Furthermore, since the ‘‘sup operator’’ 3S and
the ‘‘inf operator’’ 4S satisfy the law of distributivity, the set of stable matchings for
singles markets form a distributive lattice.
Conway’s Lattice Theorem implies that there exists a unique best stable
matching mS (called the student-optimal matching) favored by the students,
which is the worst stable matching for the hospitals, and vice versa there exists a
unique best stable matching mH (called the hospital-optimal matching) favored
by the hospitals, which is the worst stable matching for the students. In fact,
Gale and Shapley [6] already proved the existence of mS and mH; and
provided an algorithm, called the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, to calculate these
matchings.
In the next theorem we demonstrate that for responsive preferences PC the
lattice structure of the set of stable matchings in ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ need not carry
over to ðPH;PCÞ: It strengthens the negative result (on the general domain of
couples preferences) by Aldershof and Carducci [2] that there may be no
optimal matching for either side of the market. We ﬁrst introduce some more
notation.
Let m be a matching for couples market ðPH;PCÞ: Then, for couple c ¼ð sk;slÞ; we
deﬁne mðcÞ :¼ð mðskÞ;mðslÞÞ: For any two matchings m and m0; we deﬁne a function
% l   m3Cm0 that assigns to each couple its more preferred match from m and m0:
Formally, let % l ¼ m3Cm0 be deﬁned for all cAC by % lðcÞ :¼ mðcÞ if mðcÞgc m0ðcÞ and
% lðcÞ :¼ m0ðcÞ otherwise. In a similar way we deﬁne the function m4Cm0; which gives
each couple its less preferred match. The deﬁnition of functions m3Hm0 and m4Hm0 is
the same as before. The function % l ¼ m3Cm0 induces in a natural way a matching if
% lðsÞa% lðtÞ for all students s;tAS; sat: Similar statements hold for m4Cm0; m3Hm0;
and m4Hm0:
A stable matching % mC is the couples maximal matching if no other stable matching
m gives to any couple c a pair of positions mðcÞ that the couple (weakly) prefers to
% mCðcÞ: A stable matching
%
mC is the couples minimal matching if no other stable
matching m gives to any couple c a pair of positions mðcÞ that the couple likes
(weakly) less than
%
mCðcÞ: Similarly, a stable matching % mH is the hospitals maximal
matching if no other stable matching m gives to any hospital h a match mðhÞ that the
hospital (weakly) prefers to % mHðhÞ: Finally, a stable matching
%
mH is the hospitals
minimal matching if no other stable matching m gives to any hospital h a match mðhÞ
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couples have responsive preferences. Let m and m0 be two stable matchings.
(i) Functions m3Cm0; m4Cm0; m3Hm0; and m4Hm0 may not be matchings.
Furthermore, the duality for singles markets between 3S and 4H (4S and 3H
respectively) need not carry over; that is, possibly m3Cm0am4Hm0 and
m4Cm0am3Hm0:
(ii) The optimal matchings % mC;
%
mC; % mH; and
%
mH may not exist.
Proof. (i) If we take m ¼ m2 and m0 ¼ m3 (m ¼ m2 and m0 ¼ m4) in Example 3.4, then
m3Cm0 and m4Cm0 (m3Hm0 and m4Hm0) are not matchings.
(ii) It can be checked easily that none of the four stable matchings in Example 3.4
satisﬁes the deﬁnition of % mC;
%
mC; % mH; or
%
mH: &
Since in general there is more than one stable matching, a criterion one might want
to employ to select a subset of stable matchings is (the maximization of) the number
of matched agents. However, for singles markets the set of matched agents does not
vary from one stable matching to another. In other words, for singles markets the set
of unmatched agents is always the same for all stable matchings [13,15].
17 In
contrast, for couples markets Aldershof and Carducci [2] show that on the general
domain of couples preferences different stable matchings may have a different
number of positions ﬁlled. We strengthen this result by showing that on the restricted
domain of responsive preferences the number of positions that are ﬁlled at different
stable matchings may vary as well.
Theorem 4.3 (Different number of ﬁlled positions across stable matchings). Let
ðPH;PCÞ be a couples market where couples have responsive preferences. Then there
may be stable matchings that leave different numbers of positions unﬁlled.
The following example, which is a slight variation of the example used by
Aldershof and Carducci [2], proves Theorem 4.3.
Example 4.4. Consider a couples market where preferences are given by Table 5 and
the students’ individual preferences equal Pðs1Þ¼h3;h2;u;h4;h1; Pðs2Þ¼
h3;h2;h4;u;h1; Pðs3Þ¼h2;h1;h4;u;h3; and Pðs4Þ¼h1;h3;u;h2;h4: It can easily be
checked that the couples’ preferences can be completed such that they are responsive
with respect to the individual preferences. There are two stable matchings given by
m1ðHÞ¼s4;s2;s1;s3 and m2ðHÞ¼s4;s3;s2;| (see appendix), which obviously leave
different numbers of positions unﬁlled.
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17Martı´nez et al. [12] study this question for many-to-one matching markets without money. They show
that in case hospitals have ‘‘substitutable’’ preferences the number of matched agents may vary from one
stable matching to another. On the positive side, however, they establish that if preferences proﬁles satisfy
certain axioms then the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching, among other
desirable properties.
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market ðPH;PSðPCÞÞ the unique stable matching is m2; which hence is the outcome of
the Deferred Acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley [6], i.e., both the student-
and hospital-optimal matching.
Note that we could also use Example 4.4 to prove Theorem 4.2. However, in
Example 4.4 it is essential that some students are not acceptable for some hospitals
and that some couples ﬁnd certain positions unacceptable. Example 3.4 demon-
strates that the negative results in Theorem 4.2 remain true on the smaller domain of
responsive preferences where all hospitals and all students are mutually acceptable.
Before stating our next result, we deﬁne a matching mechanism as a function that
assigns a matching to each couples market. A stable-matching mechanism is a
matching mechanism that assigns a stable matching to a couples market whenever it
has a nonempty set of stable matchings. A stable-matching mechanism is strategy-
proof if no couple and no hospital can ever beneﬁt from misrepresenting its
preferences. In other words, a stable-matching mechanism is strategy-proof if truth
telling is a dominant strategy.
Our ﬁnal result on the set of stable matchings for couples markets with responsive
preferences is that there exists no strategy-proof stable-matching mechanism based
on revealed preferences. More precisely, we show that there is no stable-matching
mechanism for which stating the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every
couple.
Theorem 4.5 (No strategy-proof stable-matching mechanism). There is no stable-





h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s2 s2 s2 h3h2 h2h1
s3 s3 s4 s3 h2h3 h2h3
| s1 s1 | h3h4 h4h1
? ||? h2h4 h1h3








Different number of ﬁlled positions across stable matchings.
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for any stable-matching mechanism there exists a couples market with responsive
preferences such that at least one couple can proﬁt from misrepresenting its
preferences.
Proof. To prove the theorem we consider the couples market ðPH;PCÞ in Example
4.4 (where couples’ preferences are responsive). We show that every stable-matching
mechanism makes it possible for some couple to proﬁt by misrepresenting its
preferences.
Suppose the mechanism chooses matching m1: If couple c2 changes its preferences
from Pðc2Þ to responsive preferences Qðc2Þ¼ð h2;h3Þ; ðh2;h1Þ; ðh1;h3Þ; ðh4;h3Þ;
ðh4;h1Þ; ðh2;uÞ; ðh1;uÞ; ðh4;uÞ; ðu;h3Þ; ðu;h1Þ; ðu;uÞ; y while everyone else states
their true preferences, then m2 is the only stable matching with respect to the stated
preferences ðPH;fPðc1Þ;Qðc2ÞgÞ; see appendix. So, any stable-matching mechanism
must select m2 when the stated preferences are ðPH;fPðc1Þ;Qðc2ÞgÞ: Since m2ðc2Þ¼
ðh2;h1Þgc2ðh4;h1Þ¼m1ðc2Þ; it is not a dominant strategy for couple c2 to state its
true preferences.
Suppose the mechanism chooses matching m2: If couple c1 changes its preferences
from Pðc1Þ to responsive preferences Qðc1Þ¼ð h3;h2Þ;ðh3;uÞ;ðu;h2Þ;ðu;uÞ;y while
everyone else states their true preferences, then m1 is the only stable matching with
respect to the stated preferences ðPH;fQðc1Þ;Pðc2ÞgÞ; see appendix. So, any stable-
matching mechanism must select m1 when the stated preferences are
ðPH;fQðc1Þ;Pðc2ÞgÞ: Since m1ðc1Þ¼ð h3;h2Þgc1ðu;h3Þ¼m2ðc1Þ; it is not a dominant
strategy for couple c1 to state its true preferences. &
In fact, if in Example 4.4 the stable-matching mechanism chooses matching m1;
then also hospital h3 can proﬁt by changing its preferences from Pðh3Þ to Qðh3Þ¼
s2;s4;|;y; since the unique stable matching for ðfPðh1Þ;Pðh2Þ;Qðh3Þ;Pðh4Þg;PCÞ is
m2 and m2ðh3Þ¼s2gh3s1 ¼ m1ðh3Þ (see appendix).
Note that it is not surprising that none of the hospitals in Example 4.4 can
proﬁtably misstate its preferences when the matching mechanism chooses m2: The
reason for this is that m2 is the hospital-optimal matching in (any of) the associated
singles market(s) (see remark in Example 4.4). By a result due to Dubins and
Freedman [5] and Roth [15] it is a dominant strategy for each hospital to state its
true preferences in the associated singles market(s) if the hospital-optimal matching
is always picked. In other words, a misrepresentation of some hospital h’s
preferences in a couples market will always give rise to a stable matching that is
weakly worse for h compared with the hospital-optimal matching (of the associated
singles market(s)) when stating its true preferences. The following possibility
theorem, which also holds on the domain of weakly responsive preferences, is an
immediate consequence of this observation.
Theorem 4.6 (No proﬁtable misrepresentation by individual hospitals). The stable-
matching mechanism that yields the hospital-optimal matching (in the associated
ARTICLE IN PRESS
B. Klaus, F. Klijn / Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005) 75–106 95singles market(s)) makes it a dominant strategy for each hospital to state its true
preferences.
Remark 4.7 (Discussion of possible implications of Theorems 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6). One
of the main results of this article is the existence of stable matchings if couples have
(weakly) responsive preferences. If a labor market the couples apply to is regional
and/or the positions’ duration is short, which for example is the case of some UK
entry level labor markets for physicians and surgeons (see [20]), then it seems likely
that couples have responsive preferences. Thus, given such a situation, one could
derive the (unique) associated individual preferences from the couples’ preferences
and apply the Deferred Acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley [6] to obtain a
stable matching. However, in view of Theorem 4.3 it is not clear whether this is
desirable regarding the number of matched agents. For instance, consider Example
4.4 where the Deferred Acceptance algorithm picks stable matching m2 which does
not maximize the number of matched agents and leaves one agent unemployed. On
the other hand, Theorem 4.6 shows that if we choose m2; which is the hospital-
optimal matching resulting from the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, then at least
hospitals have no incentives to misrepresent their preferences. However, no matter
which matching the stable-matching mechanism chooses, by Theorem 4.5 stating
their true preferences is not a dominant strategy for every couple.
5. Responsiveness for couples markets and previous notions of substitutability for
singles markets
As already discussed in the Introduction, our existence results of stable matchings
when couples have (weakly) responsive preferences to some extent mirrors other
results that demonstrate that a sufﬁcient amount of substitutability implies the
existence of stable matchings for the matching market in question; see for instance
[17, many-to-one matching without money, also called the college admissions
model], [8, many-to-one matching with money], [1, college admissions with
afﬁrmative action], and [7, two-sided matching with contracts]. In contrast to our
notion of (weak) responsiveness, all substitutability conditions in these papers apply
to the preferences of the supply side (hospitals or ﬁrms) over sets of agents (students
or workers), while our responsiveness condition applies to preferences of the demand
side (couples of students) over ordered pairs of hospitals (not sets!). Alkan and
Gale’s [3, many-to-many schedule matching] substitutability condition of ‘‘persis-
tence’’ in fact applies to both, the demand and the supply side, but still does not
apply to ordered pairs as in our model. It is interesting to note that both, Alkan and
Gale’s ‘‘persistence’’ as well as Hatﬁeld and Milgrom’s [7] ‘‘substitution’’ condition
encompass Roth’s [17] ‘‘responsiveness’’ and Kelso and Crawford’s [8] ‘‘gross
substitutes’’ condition. Here, in order to compare our results with previous results
for ‘‘matching markets with substitutability’’ in a comprehensive way, we focus on
Hatﬁeld and Milgrom’s [7] results for matching markets with contracts.
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encompasses some of the previous classical models such as Gale and Shapley’s [6]
and Roth’s [17] college admissions problem or the Kelso–Crawford’s [8] ta ˆtonnement
model of wage determination in labor markets. In one of their main results Hatﬁeld
and Milgrom [7, Theorem 5] identify a maximal set of preferences over contracts (the
domain of substitutable preferences) for which a stable matching exists. The proof of
this result inspired our proof of Theorem 3.5 (Maximal Domain I result), but in
addition to our substitutability requirement of responsiveness, we had to add
restricted unemployment aversion (the fact that we consider ordered pairs of positions
for couples changes the formulation and several parts of the proof). Once we drop the
unemployment aversion requirement, we were not able to obtain a similar maximal
domain result. Instead, we demonstrated with two instructive examples (Examples 3.8
and 3.9) how a single couple may cause a labor market to be unstable even though its
preferences may be almost responsive. Example 3.8 also proves that once preferences
are not responsive, even weakly stable matchings may not exist.
In addition to the maximal domain result, Hatﬁeld and Milgrom [7, Theorem 3]
demonstrate that under their substitution condition, a stable matching can be
obtained by applying a generalization of Gale and Shapley’s [6] Deferred Acceptance
algorithm. In contrast to this approach, we show that if preferences are (weakly)
responsive one can construct a singles market such that any stable matching in the
singles market is also stable in the original couples market (Theorem 3.3). In
particular, this means that we can construct a stable matching for any (weakly)
responsive couples market using the original Gale and Shapley’s [6] Deferred
Acceptance algorithm. In fact, a generalization of the Deferred Acceptance
mechanism a ` la Hatﬁeld and Milgrom [7] would not work for responsive couples
markets since the set of stable matchings may not form a lattice (see Theorem 4.2
versus Hatﬁeld and Milgrom [7, Theorem 4]).
Next, Theorem 4.3 demonstrates that even for responsive couples markets
different numbers of positions may be ﬁlled across stable matchings. Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom [7] also conﬁrm this violation of the so-called rural hospital theorem (its
original version is due to Roth [18]) for matching markets with contracts under the
assumption of substitutability. However, by additionally requiring that preferences
on the supply side also satisfy the ‘‘law of aggregate demand’’, they are able to
restore the rural hospital theorem (Hatﬁeld and Milgrom [7, Theorem 8]). Since the
deﬁnition of the law of aggregate demand depends on the cardinality of sets of
students chosen by the hospitals, no corresponding requirement exists for couples
markets where we compare ordered pairs of positions and not the sets of positions a
couple consumes.
Finally, we prove that there is no stable-matching mechanism for couples markets
with responsive preferences for which stating the true preferences is a dominant
strategy for every couple (Theorem 4.5). A similar result has been obtained already
for the college admissions problem: Roth [17] proves that even though colleges have
responsive preferences over sets of students, no stable-matching mechanism exists
that makes it a dominant strategy for all colleges to state their true preferences. Since
Hatﬁeld and Milgrom’s [7] model encompasses Roth’s [7] formulation of the college
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in the matching with contracts context.
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Appendix. Remaining proofs
Proof of statement in Example 3.4. In Table 6 we list all 24 individually rational (full
employment) matchings for the couples market with preferences given by Table 2.
For each of the 20 unstable matchings we provide a blocking coalition. Note that
the stable matchings detected in Table 6 correspond to the stable matchings listed
in Example 3.4 as follows: matching no. 6Bm1; no. 12Bm2; no. 23Bm3; and
no. 24Bm4: &
Proof of existence of three weakly stable matching with full employment for Roth’s [16]
example. We show that for the couples market with preferences given by Table 1
there are at least three weakly stable matchings with full employment. It can easily be
checked that none of the other 21 individually rational (full employment) matchings
is weakly stable.
18 In Table 7 we list the three weakly stable matchings along with all
blocking coalitions. For each matching and for each blocking coalition we provide
another, dominating blocking coalition. &
Proof of nonexistence of weakly stable matchings in Example 3.8. We still have to
check that for the couples market with preferences given by Table 3 none of the 24
individually rational (full employment) matchings is weakly stable. We do this below
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18We only want to point out that even if there are no stable matchings, there may be weakly stable
matchings. In fact, as this example shows, the set of weakly stable matchings may contain more than one
matching. For this reason, and also to save space, we do not elaborate the proof that there are no other
weakly stable matchings, which can be obtained upon request.
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full employment matching. &
Proof of statements in Example 3.9. To show that for the couples market deﬁned by
Table 4 no stable matching exists, let H  be the seven most preferred hospital
combinations depicted in Table 4, i.e., H  ¼f ð h2;h3Þ;ðh2;h4Þ;ðh3;h2Þ;ðh3;h4Þ;
ðh4;h2Þ;ðh4;h3Þ;ðh1;uÞg:
Let m be a stable matching. Suppose that ðmðs1Þ;mðs2ÞÞeH : Then, ððs1;s2Þ;ðh1;|ÞÞ
is a blocking coalition. Hence, ðmðs1Þ;mðs2ÞÞAH :
Suppose that ðmðs3Þ;mðs4ÞÞeH : If ðmðs1Þ;mðs2ÞÞ ¼ ðh1;uÞ; then ððs3;s4Þ;ðh2;h3ÞÞ
or ððs3;s4Þ;ðh2;h4ÞÞ is a blocking coalition. If ðmðs1Þ;mðs2ÞÞaðh1;uÞ; then
ððs3;s4Þ;ðh1;|ÞÞ is a blocking coalition. Hence, ðmðs3Þ;mðs4ÞÞAH :
So, m is one of the 12 matchings depicted in Table 10. However, for each of these




Example 3.4 (Table 2)
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ
3 s1 s3 s2 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h4Þ
4 s1 s3 s4 s2 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
5 s1 s4 s2 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ
6 s1 s4 s3 s2 ——
7 s2 s1 s3 s4 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
8 s2 s1 s4 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 ——
13 s3 s1 s2 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
14 s3 s1 s4 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
15 s3 s2 s1 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þ
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h4Þ
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ
20 s4 s1 s3 s2 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
21 s4 s2 s1 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 ——
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 ——
All individually rational matchings (with a blocking coalition when possible).
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u;h1;h4;h3 is weakly stable. In Table 11 we list all blocking coalitions for this
matching, along with the blocking coalitions they are dominated by. Since each
blocking coalition is dominated by some other blocking coalition it follows that m is
weakly stable. &
Proof of statement in Example 4.4. To show that for the couples market deﬁned by
Table 5 the only two stable matchings are given by m1ðHÞ¼s4;s2;s1;s3 and m2ðHÞ¼
s4;s3;s2;|; we ﬁrst consider all 69 individually rational matchings. If we delete all the
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Table 7
Roth’s [16] example (Table 1)
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions Dominated by
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s3 s1 s2 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h2;h4Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h4Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h3Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h4Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h4Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þð s3;s4Þð h2;h4Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h3Þ
2 s3 s1 s4 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h4Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h3Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h3;h4Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h3;h1Þð s1;s2Þð h3;h4Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þð s1;s2Þð h3;h4Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h2;h3Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h4Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h1Þð s1;s2Þð h2;h3Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ
3 s3 s2 s4 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h2;h4Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þð s3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h3Þð s1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h1Þð s1;s2Þð h4;h3Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h4Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h4Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þð s3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h4Þð s3;s4Þð h1;h2Þ
Three weakly stable matchings.
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Table 8
Example 3.8 (Table 3)
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions Undominated?
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h1Þ
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ x




4 s1 s3 s4 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ




6 s1 s4 s3 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h4Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h3Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h3Þ




8 s2 s1 s4 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h1;h4Þ x
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þ
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ x
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h3Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h4;h1Þ
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h1Þ x





Matchings 1–13 not weakly stable.
B. Klaus, F. Klijn / Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005) 75–106 101matchings that leave a student and a hospital unmatched, while in fact they are
mutually acceptable, then only the 13 matchings in Table 12 remain. In the table
we give for each matching a blocking coalition whenever possible. Note that the
stable matchings detected in Table 12 correspond to the stable matchings listed in
Example 4.4 as follows: matching no. 11Bm1 and no. 13Bm2: &
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Table 9
Example 3.8 (Table 3)
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions Undominated?
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals




15 s3 s2 s1 s4 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h1Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þ
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h3Þ
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h1;h2Þ
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h1Þ x
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h1Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h1Þ
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h4Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h3Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h4;h3Þ x




21 s4 s2 s1 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h3Þ x
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ x
ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ x
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ x
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ x
ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ
Matchings 14–24 not weakly stable.
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matching in couples market ðPH;fPðc1Þ;Qðc2ÞgÞ: We consider all 69 individually
rational matchings. If we delete all the matchings that leave a student and a hospital
unmatched, while in fact they are mutually acceptable, then only the 13 matchings in
Table 13 remain. In the table we give for each matching a blocking coalition
whenever possible. Note that the only stable matching detected in Table 13 is m2:
It remains to prove that m1 is the only stable matching in couples market
ðPH;fQðc1Þ;Pðc2ÞgÞ: We consider all 31 individually rational matchings. If we delete
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Table 10
Example 3.9 (Table 4)
No. Students A blocking coalition
s1 s2 s3 s4 Students Hospitals
1 h1 uh 2 h3 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h4Þ
2 h1 uh 2 h4 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h3Þ
3 h1 uh 3 h2 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h4Þ
4 h1 uh 3 h4 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
5 h1 uh 4 h2 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h3Þ
6 h1 uh 4 h3 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
7 h2 h3 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h3;h4Þ
8 h2 h4 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h4;h3Þ
9 h3 h2 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h2;h4Þ
10 h3 h4 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h4;h2Þ
11 h4 h2 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þ
12 h4 h3 h1 u ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ
No stable matchings.
Table 11
Example 3.9 (Table 4)
No. Blocking coalitions Dominated by no.
Students Hospitals
1 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ 9
2 ðs1;s2Þð h4;h2Þ 1
3 ðs1;s2Þð h1;uÞ 2
4 ðs1;s2Þð h2;uÞ 3
5 ðs1;s2Þð h3;uÞ 4
6 ðs1;s2Þð h4;uÞ 5
7 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þ 5
8 ðs3;s4Þð h3;h2Þ 5
9 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h2Þ 8
A weakly stable matching: mðSÞ¼u;h1;h4;h3:
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are mutually acceptable, then only the 6 matchings in Table 14 remain. In the table
we give for each matching a blocking coalition whenever possible. Note that the only
stable matching detected in Table 14 is m1: &
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Table 12
Example 4.4 (Table 12)
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 | s2 s4 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h1Þ
2 | s3 s4 s2 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
3 | s1 s4 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h1Þ
4 s3 s1 s2 | ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
5 s3 s1 s4 s2 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h3Þ
6 s3 s2 s1 | ðs3;s4Þð h1;h3Þ
7 s3 s2 s4 | ðs1;s2Þð u;h3Þ
8 s3 | s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
9 s4 s1 s2 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
10 s4 s1 | s2 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
11 s4 s2 s1 s3 ——
12 s4 s3 s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
13 s4 s3 s2 | ——
13 matchings (with a blocking coalition when possible).
Table 13
Theorem 4.5
No. Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 | s2 s4 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h1;h3Þ
2 | s3 s4 s2 ðs1;s2Þð u;h3Þ
3 | s1 s4 s3 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h3Þ
4 s3 s1 s2 | ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
5 s3 s1 s4 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h2;h3Þ
6 s3 s2 s1 | ðs3;s4Þð h1;h3Þ
7 s3 s2 s4 | ðs1;s2Þð u;h3Þ
8 s3 | s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
9 s4 s1 s2 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h2;h1Þ
10 s4 s1 | s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
11 s4 s2 s1 s3 ðs3;s4Þð h4;h3Þ
12 s4 s3 s1 s2 ðs1;s2Þð h3;h2Þ
13 s4 s3 s2 | ——
Manipulation by c2; 13 matchings (a blocking coalition when possible).
B. Klaus, F. Klijn / Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005) 75–106 104Proof of statement right after Theorem 4.5. We have to prove that m2 is the unique
stable matching for ðfPðh1Þ;Pðh2Þ;Qðh3Þ;Pðh4Þg;PCÞ: We consider all 52 individu-
ally rational matchings. If we delete all the matchings that leave a student and a
hospital unmatched, while in fact they are mutually acceptable, then only the 11
matchings in Table 15 remain. In the table we give for each matching a blocking
coalition whenever possible. Note that the only stable matching detected in Table 15
is m2: &
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